Claudia, Kamala, and China

During the past fortnight, Kamala Harris strengthened her position in the polls, bringing closer the idea that the governments of both neighboring countries will soon be led by women who have much in common. Both are professionals—one a scientist, the other a lawyer—contemporaries born in the early '60s, and both with a leftist ideology, which presents an opportunity for understanding between the two nations.

To clarify where there are common goals and where there are divergences, it is interesting, therefore, to make a forecast of the visions that both administrations will have on important geopolitical issues. An increasingly important topic for both economies is how their relations with China will be.

For the United States, its relationship with China is on a trajectory of political, economic, and commercial frictions that risk a military collision in the long term.

In her acceptance speech for the Democratic Party's nomination, Harris defined her stance by announcing that "it will be the United States, not China, who will win the competition in the 21st century."

It is clear that Harris will continue with a dual strategy of economic decoupling and containment of China, strengthening regional alliances specifically through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes Australia, India, and Japan, and the trilateral AUKUS alliance with Australia and the United Kingdom.

The first aims to coordinate the region's security agendas, while AUKUS seeks to develop advanced military technological capabilities such as nuclear-powered submarines and autonomous, quantum, cyber, and hypersonic technologies. Therefore, Harris's vision will focus on strengthening U.S. multilateralism, also emphasizing a framework of adherence to human rights.

Her vision differs from that of Trump, who would rely primarily on unilateral confrontation. For Claudia Sheinbaum and Mexico, China theoretically represents an opportunity for economic expansion and trade diversification.

China can be seen as a relatively new and tempting option to balance relations with the U.S., a kind of uncomfortable but stabilizing partner to obtain technology and develop infrastructure projects through low-interest loans.

But this idea is far from reality. Although trade with China has grown exponentially, it has not been balanced: for every 10 dollars Mexico exports to China, it imports 100, a very negative balance.

Beijing, therefore, is a mega supplier of low-cost electronic components, which creates a risky codependency that will eventually have commercial, political, and social edges. This exponentially increased relationship creates instability in the medium and long term.

The opportunity for Mexico in this six-year term lies in developing a chain of local suppliers to replace Chinese imports in a context of clear rules, and this is where industrial and technological cooperation with the U.S. can fit in.

The arrival of relatively coincident and contemporary visions opens a door of opportunity for a better understanding between Mexico and the United States, both in advancing the common North American agenda and in making better use of their relations with China.

By Iñigo Guevara
Director of the Intelligence Company Janes and Visiting Academic at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.