Drugs: Trafficking Will Continue

The capture of Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada García, co-founder of the Sinaloa Cartel, has drawn significant public attention in Mexico and has had a substantial media, political, and law enforcement impact. However, its importance in the fight against drug trafficking and consumption is quite relative, even though he is one of the world's most wanted drug lords.

It's well known that the Sinaloa Cartel is a criminal empire whose drug smuggling operations will continue despite the leadership vacuum caused by Zambada's arrest. This is because the demand for fentanyl and other narcotics remains unchanged, and criminal organizations will surely meet this demand through their effective international distribution channels.

Some of us wonder when the failure of prohibitionism will be understood and when drug trafficking and demand will be addressed as health problems rather than policing issues. As I have argued before, this problem spiraled out of control many years ago, and its solution is not the bloody warfare that proved unsuccessful in Mexico during the previous two presidential terms.

The failed antidote to the drug problem, prohibition, still persists, fueled and demanded by a government—the United States—that absurdly demands a halt to drug smuggling from the south while itself fostering the issue by not curbing arms smuggling.

The story of Zambada's arrest and the surrounding events, of which only part is known so far, admits a variety of interpretations, even conflicting ones. For example, should the incarceration of El Mayo Zambada be considered a success of the US's prohibitionist and persecution policy? Many think so, but the harsh reality is that—according to the most credible version so far—the arrest resulted from an act of betrayal by another drug lord, one of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán's sons, Joaquín Guzmán López, who handed Zambada over to the US.

In other words, the capture was not the result of a US law enforcement investigation but a plot orchestrated by one of the Chapitos, who, to add another layer of treachery, is El Mayo's godson. It's surprising that a seasoned criminal like Zambada, accustomed to distrust and evading narcotics pursuers, fell so easily into the Chapito's trap. Is there something explaining this that is still unknown? Regardless, betrayals are not uncommon in the world of drug trafficking, including within the Sinaloa Cartel.

Another aspect to analyze is the inefficacy of the Mexican intelligence apparatus, which not only was unaware of the action against El Mayo but has also been unable to investigate what really happened in the bizarre episode that likely involved US law enforcement officers without Mexican government authorization or knowledge.

"The Replacements Are Already Out There"

Now, what will happen to drug trafficking to the US after El Mayo's capture? Is the Sinaloa Cartel, that criminal empire with global ramifications, leaderless? A response was given in 2010 by Zambada himself to Proceso founder Julio Scherer García when he suggested that even if he were captured or killed, things would continue the same. "As for the drug lords who are imprisoned, dead, or extradited, their replacements are already out there," he remarked in the historic interview with Scherer.

By advocating for the need to regulate the production, transportation, and consumption of narcotics instead of prohibiting them, some of us have argued—coinciding with Zambada—just that: the capture of major drug lords, despite the fanfare, generally does not impact the reduction of drug trafficking. Mexico and other countries exemplify this reality.

Regarding the Sinaloa Cartel, the probable new leader is already being mentioned in the media: Ismael Zambada Sicairos, El Mayito Flaco, son of Zambada García. However, it should be noted that the powerful cartel operates with at least four factions dividing the operations and market. One of these factions is led by Iván Archibaldo Guzmán Salazar, whose half-brother, Joaquín Guzmán López, was arrested in the US along with El Mayo.

According to the US DEA, the fragmented structure of the organization allows the leaders of the four groups to share smuggling routes, contacts, access to illicit chemical suppliers, and money laundering networks. What they don't share are the profits.

By Eduardo R. Huchim

Collaborator

@eduardorhuchim